In this paper, we consider the problem of assessing the adversarial robustness of deep neural network models under both Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and Bayesian Dark Knowledge (BDK) inference approximations. We characterize the robustness of each method to two types of adversarial attacks: the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) and projected gradient descent (PGD). We show that full MCMC-based inference has excellent robustness, significantly outperforming standard point estimation-based learning. On the other hand, BDK provides marginal improvements. As an additional contribution, we present a storage-efficient approach to computing adversarial examples for large Monte Carlo ensembles using both the FGSM and PGD attacks.
Introduction
Deep learning models have shown promising results in areas including computer vision, natural language processing, speech recognition, and more (Krizhevsky, Sutskever, and Hinton 2012; Graves, Jaitly, and Mohamed 2013; Graves, Mohamed, and Hinton 2013; Huang et al. 2016; Devlin et al. 2018) . Despite these advances, deep neural networks are well-known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. An adversarial example is an example that differs from a natural example through a low-norm additive perturbation while resulting in an incorrect prediction relative to the unperturbed example (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014) . The lack of robustness to adversarial examples is a crucial barrier to the safe deployment of deep learning models in many applications.
One potential source of adversarial examples in traditional point-estimated deep neural network models derives from the fact that the decision boundary geometry can be minimally constrained away from the training data during learning. This can lead to quite arbitrary decision boundaries away from the training data, which may be easily attackable (Nguyen, Yosinski, and Clune 2015) . By contrast, Bayesian inference methods result in predictable and well-behaved decision boundary geometry off of the training data due to the Bayesian model averaging effect when computing the posterior predictive distribution. If many decision boundary * Equal contribution. Presented at SafeAI 2020. geometries are all equally likely in a given region of feature space, the posterior predictive distribution will average over all of them resulting in both posterior class probabilities and decision boundary geometry with improved smoothness, which may be harder to attack with low-norm adversarial perturbations.
Indeed, Gal and Smith (2018) present theoretical evidence that under certain sufficient conditions there exists no adversarial examples for a Bayesian classification model. However, show that Bayesian neural networks implemented using variational inference lack robustness against adversarial samples, and subsequently present a method that attempts to make them more robust.
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods are one of the primary alternatives to variational methods for performing approximate inference in Bayesian neural networks. While we defer the background on Bayesian neural networks to the next section, it is important to note that MCMC methods give an unbiased estimate to the parameter posterior and the posterior predictive distribution, while variational methods are typically biased. However, MCMC methods require materializing or storing samples of the parameter posterior in order to make predictions, which can have high computational complexity and storage cost.
To help overcome these problems, Balan et al. (2015) introduced a model distillation method referred to as Bayesian Dark Knowledge (BDK). In the classification setting, Bayesian Dark Knowledge attempts to compress the Bayesian posterior predictive distribution induced by the full parameter posterior of a "teacher" network into a single, compact "student" network. The major advantage of this approach is that the computational complexity of prediction at test time is drastically reduced. This method has been shown to successfully reproduce the full posterior predictive distribution on test data drawn from the training distribution (Balan et al. 2015) .
In this paper, we consider the problem of assessing the adversarial robustness of deep neural network models under both the MCMC and Bayesian Dark Knowledge approximations. We characterize the robustness of each method to two types of adversarial attacks: the fast gradient sign method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014) and projected gradient descent (PGD) (Madry et al. 2017) . We consider the case of a basic convolutional neural network (CNN) architecture and the MNIST and CIFAR10 data sets. Interestingly, we show that full MCMC-based inference has excellent robustness to these adversarial attacks, significantly outperforming standard point estimation-based learning, while BDK only provides marginal improvements. This indicates that the BDK distillation procedure is failing to fully capture the structure of the true posterior predictive distribution off of the training data. As an additional contribution, we present a storage-efficient approach to computing adversarial examples for large Monte Carlo ensembles using both the FGSM and PGD attacks.
Background
Bayesian Neural Networks: Let p(y|x, θ) represent the probability distribution induced by a deep neural network classifier over classes y ∈ Y = {1, .., C} given feature vectors x ∈ R D . The most common way to fit a model of this type given a data set D = {(x i , y i )|1 ≤ i ≤ N } is to use maximum conditional likelihood estimation, or equivalently, cross entropy loss minimization (or their penalized or regularized variants). However, when the volume of labeled data is low, there can be multiple advantages to considering a full Bayesian treatment of the model. Instead of attempting to find the single (locally) optimal parameter set θ * according to a given criterion, Bayesian inference uses Bayes rule to define the posterior distribution p(θ|D, θ 0 ) over the unknown parameters θ given a prior distribution P (θ|θ 0 ) with prior parameters θ 0 as seen in Equation 1.
For prediction problems in machine learning, the quantity of interest is typically not the parameter posterior itself, but the posterior predictive distribution p(y|x, D, θ 0 ) obtained from it as seen in Equation 2. The primary problem with applying Bayesian inference to neural network models is that the distributions p(θ|D, θ 0 ) and p(y|x, D, θ 0 ) are not available in closed form, so approximations are required. Most Bayesian inference approximations studied in the machine learning literature are based on variational inference (VI) (Jordan et al. 1999) or Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods (Neal 1996; Welling and Teh 2011) . In VI, an auxiliary distribution q φ (θ) is defined to approximate the true parameter posterior p(θ|D, θ 0 ). The main drawback of VI and related methods is that they typically result in biased posterior estimates for complex posterior distributions. MCMC methods provide an alternative family of sampling-based posterior approximations that are unbiased. The samples generated using MCMC methods can then be used to approximate the posterior predictive distribution using a Monte Carlo average as shown in Equation 3.
Neal (1996) 3 ) of a neural network into another neural network. We will discuss the details of both methods in Section 3. Adversarial Attacks: Adversarial examples are carefully crafted perturbations to a classifier input that are designed to mislead a classifier while being as imperceptible as possible. Based on the information available to the adversary, these attacks are broadly categorized as whitebox and black-box attacks. Most methods for adversarial attacks on deep learning models operate in the white-box setting (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014; Madry et al. 2017; Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio 2016; Moosavi-Dezfooli, Fawzi, and Frossard 2016; Sabour et al. 2015; Carlini and Wagner 2016) , where the model being attacked, and its gradients, are assumed to be fully known. Conversely, the black-box setting (Brendel, Rauber, and Bethge 2017; Cheng et al. 2018; Chen et al. 2017; Tu et al. 2019; Ilyas et al. 2018) requires an attacker to find an adversarial perturbation when its only access to the model is via labeling queries.
The most successful adversarial attacks use gradientbased optimization methods. For example, the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014) is a one-step method that uses the sign of the gradient to create adversarial examples:
x adv = x + sign(∇ x L(θ, x, y)), (4) where L is the standard cross-entropy loss computed using the model prediction given input x and the original label y, and governs the magnitude of the perturbation introduced and can be thought of as a step size. Kurakin, Goodfellow, and Bengio (2017) extended this to a multi-step variant which is more powerful than single step FGSM. Both the methods are, however, limited to generating ∞ -bounded perturbations. Madry et al. (2017) introduced a more general multi-step variant, which is essentially projected gradient descent (PGD) on the negative loss function. FGSMbased attacks can be seen as specific instances of PGD under ∞ -bounded perturbations. The main emphasis of the PGD attack is to apply FGSM k times (number of iterations) with step-size α ≤ /k, where is the maximum distortion (i.e., attack strength) of the adversarial example compared to the original input. The resulting adversarial example x t+1 corresponding to input x is computed as follows:
x t+1 = Π x+S (x t + α sign(∇ x L(θ, x, y))) (5) where Π x+S is the projection onto the ∞ ball of radius centred at x.
Methods

Approximate Bayesian Inference Methods
For implementing approximate Bayesian inference in neural networks, we adopt the use of the stochastic gradient Langevin dynamics (SGLD) (Welling and Teh 2011) method as a computationally efficient MCMC sampler. We compare the adversarial robustness of the SGLD approximation to the posterior predictive distribution to that provided by Bayesian dark knowledge (BDK) (Balan et al. 2015) , which is drastically more efficient to deploy. SGLD is also used at the core of the BDK posterior distillation algorithm. We begin by reviewing SGLD, and then describe BDK.
Let p(θ|λ) be the prior distribution over the network model parameters θ. The prior distribution is selected to be a spherical Gaussian distribution centered at 0 with precision denoted by λ. We define S to be a minibatch of size M drawn from D. Let the total number of training samples in D be denoted by N . θ t denotes the parameter set sampled from the model at sampling iteration t, while η t denotes the learning rate at iteration t. The Langevin noise is denoted by z t ∼ N (0, η t I). The sampling update for SGLD can be written as seen below where p (y i |x i , θ t ) is the likelihood:
By running this update, we produce a sequence of samples that converges to the posterior distribution of the model we are sampling from. This set of samples forms a Monte Carlo ensemble and is used in Equation 3 when making predictions. In BDK terminology, the model we sample from is referred to as the "teacher" model and the set of sampled models is referred to as the "teacher ensemble." BDK aims to compress the true posterior predictive distribution as approximated by a teacher ensemble into a compact, feedforward neural network model (referred to as the "student" model) using distillation methods to avoid the need to store samples and compute predictions using Equation 3 at deployment time.
To learn the student model, BDK generates a batch of samples S . S is obtained by adding Gaussian noise of small magnitude to S. The output of the teacher model on samples {(x , y )} ∈ S is approximated using the current sample from the teacher model: p(y |x , θ t+1 ). Similarly, the output of the student model, parameterized by ω t , is computed as p(y |x , ω t ). The objective function for learning the student is the KL divergence between the teacher model's predictive distribution and the student model's predictive distribution: L(ω t |S , θ t+1 ) = (x ,y )∈S KL(p(y |x , θ t+1 )||p(y |x , ω t )) and we run a single optimization iteration on it to obtain ω t+1 . This process of sequentially computing θ t+1 and ω t+1 is repeated until convergence.
Attacking Approximate Bayesian Inference
To investigate the adversarial robustness of the Monte Carlo ensembles produced produced by SGLD and the distilled student models produced by BDK, we apply two common forms of attacks adopted in the literature: PGD and FGSM.
Both of these attacks rely on computing the gradient of the cross-entropy loss function between the model output and labels w.r.t the inputs. This presents a computational challenge when the model we must attack is a large Monte Carlo ensemble consisting of hundreds or thousands of models. Indeed, even explicitly storing all of the models in the ensemble can be a challenge. To address this problem, we leverage the fact that the gradient of the loss w.r.t input of the ensemble is a sum of the gradients of the loss w.r.t the input for each model in the ensemble. For an ensemble {θ i } K i=1 consisting of K models sampled from the posterior, the gradient of the loss L(·; θ 1:K ) w.r.t. input x can be expressed as:
The previous equation follows directly from Equation 3. As can be seen clearly, we only need access to a single model from the ensemble at a time and accumulate the gradients to obtain the gradient of the ensemble. This enables us to perform FGSM and PGD attacks with constant memory while scaling up the number of models in the ensemble. Further, if we have access to the data, we only actually need to store a starting model and a random seed. The rest of the elements of the ensemble can be sequentially materialized by re-running the SGLD sampling iteration. This allows us to also generate attacks for large ensembles while using constant storage cost. We note that this corresponds to an incredibly strong attack against a Bayesian model as we effectively assume that we have access to every element of the approximating Monte Carlo ensemble, despite the fact that the samples could be updated at any time. Finally, we note that attacking the BDK student model is straightforward since the student is a standard feed-forward model. This attack requires no additional modifications to the original algorithms.
Experiments
Our experiments focus on the untargeted attack setting where the goal is to cause the model to misclassify inputs that are otherwise correctly classified. We consider the ∞ threat model for the experiments. We study the adversarial robustness of SGLD Monte Carlo ensembles and distilled BDK student models. We compare their performance to standard point estimation of the same model (we use Adam as the optimizer). We consider the white-box FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014) and PGD (Madry et al. 2017) attacks. We evaluate the models on MNIST (Lecun et al. 1998 ) and CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, Hinton, and others 2009) datasets in terms of attack success rate and accuracy on unperturbed test data. We define the attack success rate as the percentage of the number of inputs successfully perturbed using the attack method to the total number of input images that we attempt to perturb. In all experiments, images that are already misclassified by any model are excluded from the attack set. All results are based on the test set, which consists of 10000 examples for each data set. 
Models:
We utilize CNNs for both the teacher ensemble and the student model. Further, for a given data set, we use the same architecture for the teacher as well as the student. For MNIST, we use the following architecture: Input(1, (28,28))-Conv(num kernels=10, kernel size=4, stride=1) -MaxPool(kernel size=2) -Conv(num kernels=20, kernel size=4, stride=1) -MaxPool(kernel size=2) -FC (80) -FC (output). For CIFAR10, we utilize the following architecture: Input(3, (32,32)) -Conv(num kernels=16, kernel size=5) -MaxPool(kernel size=2) -Conv(num kernels=32, kernel size=5) -MaxPool(kernel size=2) -FC(200) -FC (50) -FC (output).
Model and Distillation Hyperparameters: We run the SGLD and distillation procedure using the following hyperparameters: fixed teacher learning rate η t = 4 × 10 −6 for MNIST and η t = 3 × 10 −6 for CIFAR10, teacher prior precision λ = 10, initial student learning rate ρ t = 10 −3 , burn-in iterations B = 1000 for MNIST and B = 10000 for CIFAR10, thinning interval τ = 100, and total training iterations T = 10 6 . For training the student model, we use the Adam algorithm and set a learning schedule for the student such that it halves its learning rate every 200 epochs for MNIST, and every 400 epochs for CIFAR10.
Results: Figure 1 compares the performance of standard, SGLD and BDK models on MNIST and CIFAR10. We vary the ∞ distortion from 0.05 to 0.3 for MNIST and from 0.005 to 0.05 for CIFAR10 and report the attack success rates of FGSM and PGD. For PGD attacks, we run 40 iterations with step size of 0.05 for MNIST and 0.005 for CI-FAR10. Note that lower attack success rate implies higher adversarial robustness. We can see that the SGLD Monte Carlo ensembles are significantly more robust to the adversarial attack than the standard models. We also observe that the adversarial robustness as well as accuracy of SGLD models increase as the number of models in the ensemble increases. We see that the BDK student models only provide a marginal increase in robustness as the amount of noise used for distillation increases. However, this comes at the price of accuracy as shown in Figures 1c and 1f where we observe that test accuracy on unperturbed test data decreases with increasing noise for BDK student models.
Conclusions and Future Directions
We have considered the problem of assessing the adversarial robustness of deep neural network models under both the Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) and Bayesian Dark Knowledge (BDK) inference approximations. Interestingly, our results show that full MCMC-based inference has excellent robustness, significantly outperforming standard point estimation-based learning, while BDK provides marginal improvement. A key direction for future work will thus be to further investigate the failure of BDK to fully capture the posterior predictive distribution to see if its deployment-time computational advantages over MCMC-based methods can be preserved while enhancing its adversarial robustness.
